Moscow is making progress through bilateral agreements, but African states should not get involved in a global proxy conflict.
In early June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Guinea, the Republic of Congo, and Burkina Faso. This was his sixth visit to Africa since 2022. As Russia steps up its diplomatic offensive, can African states escape the geopolitical competition between Moscow and the West?
The rivalry has intensified with the war in Ukraine, with several European countries accusing Russia of waging a coordinated sabotage campaign in the European Union (EU). The Kremlin says its growing presence in Africa is not aimed at competing with the West, but anti-Western rhetoric often accompanies Russian visits.
The Russo-Ukrainian war has increased the importance of Africa in Russian foreign policy. In 2016, this policy envisaged minimal engagement with the continent; however, the 2023 version considers Africa as a “distinctive and influential center of global development.”
Africa represents the largest voting bloc in the United Nations, with 54 of the 193 voting members. Not surprisingly, Western, Ukrainian, and Russian diplomats tried to secure the support of African states at the start of the war. But the conflict has had negative repercussions on international food, energy, and financial systems. Food security has become a pressing issue for Africa, and the Kremlin has used this to present itself as an alternative partner.
Russia is sometimes the only international partner of African countries under sanctions
Yet, despite public statements, Russia’s efforts remain below expectations for three reasons. First, Russia ‘s trade volume with Africa in 2022 ($18.4 billion) was lower than that of traditional partners, such as China ($199 billion), Italy ($76.3 billion), France ($67.8 billion), the United States ($65.7 billion), and Germany ($45 billion).
Moreover, African imports from Russia account for less than 2%, much less than those from other trading partners (see chart). These trends may justify African countries’ reluctance to Moscow’s strategic pivot. Only 17 African heads of state participated in the 2023 Russia-Africa summit, compared to more than double that number in 2019.
African imports from selected global trading partners Source: Trade Map, International Trade Centre
Second, the end of the Russian naval blockade by Ukraine in 2023 has eased restrictions on grain exports, supporting an expected decline in food prices by 2024. Food security remains crucial in Russia-Ukraine-Africa relations, but war is no longer a priority for the continent. Some African states, such as Morocco, have taken advantage of the trade disruption to increase their market share .
Finally, at the Russia-Africa summit in 2023, several African states chose non-alignment. This situation could hardly change. Therefore, world powers are competing for Africa’s support on specific issues.
Moscow’s bilateral engagements are bearing fruit. First, Russia’s reconnection with Africa has been accelerated by geopolitical changes in the Sahel, challenging the dominance of traditional powers and creating an economic and security vacuum in the “coup belt.”
The six Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa have signed military agreements with Russia
The Kremlin’s openness to unconditional partnerships has made Russia the new favorite, sometimes the only international partner, of isolated and sanctioned countries. Two of the three countries Lavrov visited in June – Guinea and Burkina Faso – recent coup scenes, are under sanctions, including from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After the 2023 coup in Niger, Russia warned ECOWAS against resorting to military measures in the country.
And while Moscow’s actions may weaken ECOWAS and African Union responses to coups, Russia is not seen as a disruptor by West African countries. Just as in Syria , Russia is leveraging its growing importance by participating in regional peace and security discussions.
But Russia’s greatest success lies in bilateral security agreements, including training and arms supplies. Lavrov’s visit coincided with that of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov to Libya and Niger. Russia is expected to sign security agreements with Chad, Guinea, Congo, Libya and Niger.
According to a new report by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Yevkurov is now in charge of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) operations in Africa. Wagner’s illicit activities on the continent, likened to those of an organized crime group, include smuggling and money laundering. Although the Kremlin claims a degree of separation, Wagner has supported Moscow’s interests.
Russia has concluded bilateral security agreements, including training and arms supplies
According to PISM, Africa Corps, under new leadership, is effectively pursuing Russian strategic goals, focusing on formal economic and security cooperation to supplant Western political influence in Africa by establishing alternative security cooperation arrangements.
Russia’s cooperation with the Sahel states comes at the expense of France, whose influence in the region has waned. A recent report found that France is set to significantly reduce its military presence in West and Central Africa due to a lack of demand for training and security partnerships. Russia is also making gains in Lusophone Africa, which worries Portugal. All six Lusophone African countries have signed military agreements with Russia.
This strategy is gradually bearing fruit. Bilateral agreements with Russia will not tip the global balance of power in Africa, but will make African states more cautious about their stance on the war in Ukraine or their criticism of Moscow.
This is evidenced by the limited participation of African countries in the Swiss peace summit in Ukraine this month. Before the event, Russia and Ukraine put pressure on countries of the “South,” particularly in Africa. Russia criticized the summit and tried to dissuade countries from participating. Ukraine worked to ensure the participation of countries of the South, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy personally inviting several African leaders.
Although the summit’s agenda included non-binding humanitarian issues such as prisoner exchange, return of Ukrainian children and food security, only 13 African countries participated, 10 of which signed the final declaration.
Russia’s growing presence should not be seen as a danger, and can complement Africa’s relationships with new and traditional partners. But while African states are less concerned about the war in Ukraine, the continent remains a priority for Ukraine, Russia, and other major powers. These global competitors seek Africa’s support or neutrality, but African countries should not invest in a proxy war.
Join our global community of readers who seek to understand the evolving dynamics between China & Africa. Let's see the world from the Global South's perspective.
